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Many philosophers believe that 1) most uses of functional language in biology make 
implicit reference to natural selection and 2) the fundamental way in which biologists 
identify parts and processes in organisms is by their selected function(s). Both these 
claims are mistaken. Much functional language in biology refers to actual causal roles, 
and if this were not so, biology would be impossible. The extensive biological literature 
on the ‘character concept’ focuses on another principle of biological identity, namely 
homology. I outline some of this work and use it to refute philosophical arguments for the 





Over the past quarter of a century a notion of function defined in terms of natural 
selection has become one of the basic tools of analytic philosophy. Philosophers with no 
other interest in the biological sciences reach for the ‘etiological theory of function’ 
(Millikan 1984, 1993; Neander 1991a, 1991b) to distinguish between what merely 
happens and what is supposed to happen. The etiological theory embodies the standard 
neo-Darwinian view (Pittendrigh 1958, 191-3) that biological teleology was rendered 
scientifically respectable by natural selection: 
 
"If we ask 'What does a cat have sharp, curved claws for?' and answer simply 'To 
catch mice with', this does not imply a profession of any mythical teleology, but 
the plain statement that catching mice is the function whose survival value, by the 
process of natural selection, has bred cats with this particular form of claw.  
Unless selection is at work, the question 'What for?' cannot receive an answer 
with any real meaning." (Konrad Lorenz 1966, 9) 
 
The English word ‘function’ has many different senses. Two of these seem particularly 
prominent in the biosciences (Godfrey-Smith 1993, Griffiths 1993): 
 
• Selected effect (SE) function: a sequence of nucleotides GAU has the SE function 
of coding for aspartic acid if that sequence evolved by natural selection because it 
had the effect of inserting that amino acid into some polypeptide in ancestral 
organisms 
                                                 
1
 Paper presented at ‘The concept of function in biology and language’, Universitá di Catania, May 2005. I 
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an earlier draft. 
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• Causal role (CR) function: a sequence of nucleotides GAU has the CR function of 
coding for aspartic acid if that sequence has the effect of inserting that amino acid 
into some polypeptide in the organism in which it occurs 
 
The idea of causal role function (Cummins 1975) is sometimes presented as a rival to the 
etiological theory (Davies 2001; Lewens 2004). However, both notions are needed to 
capture the conventional, neo-Darwinian understanding of evolution by natural selection. 
Neo-Darwinism distinguishes between adaptations, which have evolved by natural 
selection, and adaptive traits, which increase the fitness of organisms that possess them 
relative to other types. By definition, every adaptation was once an adaptive trait, but not 
all adaptations are still adaptive and not every adaptive trait is yet an adaptation.  If we 
use the language of functions, a trait is adaptive in virtue of some of its CR functions. 
The SE functions of a trait are those CR functions of the same trait in ancestors which 
caused it to be selected.  
 
In this paper, I argue that much functional language in biology refers to CR function. 
Furthermore, enthusiasts for SE function are mistaken when they claim that SE function 
is the primary means by which biologists individuate the parts and processes of the 
organisms they study. Straightforward descriptions of the structure and CR function of 
parts and processes, and classifications of those parts and processes by homology, are 
essential before anything coherent can be said about their SE function. This second point 
concerns the nature of ‘biological characters’. A ‘character’ is a unit of biological 
analysis – a part of an organism or a process going on in an organism. ‘Character’ 
simpliciter is often used to refer to a determinable (eye colour, a genetic locus) while 
‘character state’ refers to a determinate value of that determinable (blue, AAATCG). 
There are many pragmatically successful ways to divide organisms into characters for the 
purposes of analysis, but a full theoretical analysis of the character concept remains 
elusive and is the subject of some of the most incisive theoretical work in evolutionary 
developmental biology (recent collections include Hall 1994, 1999; Schlosser and 
Wagner 2004; Wagner 2001). The scientific debate assumes that characters are 
‘homologies’ in one of the various senses to be defined below: they are individuated by 
common ancestry or common developmental mechanisms. In contrast, it has become 
widely accepted amongst philosophers that biological categories of part and process are 
defined by their SE function. The claim that a heart is an organ whose SE function is to 
pump blood is commonly taken as an epitome of anatomical classification. Karen 
Neander is perhaps the leading advocate of this view, and in her (2002) defends it against 
‘functional minimalism’ - the suggestion by Ronald Amundson and George Lauder 
(1994) and myself (1994) that sciences like anatomy, physiology and comparative 
morphology are primarily concerned with characters individuated by homology. Neander 
thinks that classification by adaptive function is more common in these sciences than 
either Amundson and Lauder or I allow. Neander is particularly critical of my (1994) 
treatment of the homology concept. My account is certainly not an adequate account of 
homology in the anatomical and physiological sciences. The 1990s saw an explosion of 
new work on homology as a result of the discovery of ‘deep homology’ in molecular 
developmental biology and the meteoric rise of the new discipline of evolutionary 
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developmental biology (Hall 1992; Arthur 1997; Raff 1996). My (1994) treatment does 
not take account of these new development, which I did not address until my (1999). 
However, neither Neander’s criticisms of my (1994) account nor her own positive 
proposals are grounded in this recent literature on homology. Instead, her case for what 
we might call ‘functional revanchism’2 is driven by the same fundamental idea that has 
driven her work on biological categories for the last two decades (Neander 1983). 
Neander argues that any classification of organisms into parts must allow there to be 
abnormal instances of each part. She argues that only a classification in terms of adaptive 
function will create categories that are ‘abnormality inclusive’. A similar theme has been 
important in Ruth Millikan’s work. Her (2002) argues that a biologically meaningful 
causal analysis of a system’s functioning (CR function) can only be conducted in the light 
of an understanding of the ‘proper functioning’ of the system (SE function). 
 
What is ‘functional minimalism’? My view has always been that there are two 
fundamental aspects to the evolutionary process, common descent and adaptation. These 
give rise to two overlaid patterns in the distribution of biological forms, one captured by 
phylogeny and homology, the other by functional classifications. Evolution is a matter of 
‘genealogical actors playing ecological roles’ (Hull 1987). Classification by genealogy is 
seen in modern, phylogenetic systematics, and in the use of homology in sciences such as 
anatomy, physiology, and comparative morphology. But the same organisms and parts of 
organisms are classified in terms of their ecological role: organisms are classified into 
ecological categories like predator and prey and parts are classified by their adaptive 
function (Griffiths 1994, 1996a, 1996b). The difference between ‘functional minimalists’ 
and ‘functional revanchists’ concerns function-talk in disciplines such as anatomy, 
physiology, developmental biology and molecular biology which experimentally 
investigate the structure and function of biological systems. Functional minimalists 
maintain that unless these fields turn their attention to specifically evolutionary questions, 
they investigate function in the CR sense. Revanchists reply that they are always, at least 
implicitly, investigating function in the SE sense.  
 
In contrast to the mass of philosophical work on SE function (Allen, Bekoff, and Lauder 
1997; Buller 1999; Ariew, Cummins, and Perlman 2002), there has until recently been 
little philosophical work on homology  (but see Matthen 1998, 2000). In my own work 
homology is treated as a concept rooted in phylogenetic systematics. Recently, however, 
philosophers of biology have turned their attention to evolutionary developmental 
biology, a field that has generated an extremely sophisticated theoretical discourse around 
the concepts of homology, modularity and character. Philosophers have responded to, and 
indeed taken part in, this discussion (Love 2001, 2004; Love and Raff 2003; Raff and 
Love 2004; Brigandt 2002, 2003a; Winther 2001, In Press). Before responding to 
functional revanchism in more detail I need to lay out the basic assumptions about 
homology derived from this literature which will underpin my discussion.  
 
 
                                                 
2
 By analogy with the ‘revanchist’ desire of a defeated nation to regain its territory and prestige. 




‘Homologue… The same organ in different animals under every variety of form and 
function’ (Owen 1843, 374).  
 
Homology is a relation of biological ‘sameness’ (Camardi 2001; Brigandt 2002). Here I 
lay out three fundamentals about homology in contemporary biology: homology is an 
equivalence relation that groups characters into a hierarchy of equivalence classes; 
homologies can be identified at different levels of biological organisation; and there are 
numerous theoretical elucidations of homology, whose relation to the phenomenon of 
homology is analogous to the relation of the many so-called ‘species concepts’ to the 
phenomenon of biodiversity. 
 
2.1 Homology forms a hierarchy of equivalence classes 
Like biological taxa, the homologous parts of organisms form groups within groups. The 
wing of a European house sparrow is homologous to the wing of a flamingo – both are 
avian wings. The avian wing is homologous to the forelimb of a lizard – both are tetrapod 
forelimbs. The tetrapod forelimb is homologous to the pectoral fin of a sarcopterygian 
fish – both are instances of the anterior paired appendages of Sarcopterygii. None of 
these relationships is a matter of degree – the avian wing is not more or less a homologue 
of the pectoral fin any more than the class Aves is more or less part of the Sarcopterygii 
or a sparrow more or less a bird. When Neander writes that ‘Homology is a relation of 
degree, somewhat akin to the relation of resemblance or genetic relatedness’ (Neander 
2002, 402) she must have been misled by an unusual usage of the word ‘homology’ in 
molecular biology (see below, 2.4) or by phrases like ‘closely homologous’. The latter 
refers to ‘taxonomic distance', which is a measure on the topology of a cladogram or a 
phylogenetic tree, and no more implies that homology is a degree property than the claim 
that two species of birds are ‘closely related’ implies that membership of a taxon is a 
degree property. There are also cases have led biologists to talk of ‘partial homology’, 
such as when the embryonic primordia that typically give rise to two different parts of a 
plant fuse to form a single part during the ontogeny of an atypical species (e.g. Sattler 
1990). Some authors have also written of ‘partial homology’ when large characters in 
different species can be analysed into smaller characters only some of which are 
homologous. For example, some but not all regions of chromosome 2 in the D genome of 
hexaploid wheat are homologous to rice chromosome 4. Finally, some authors have 
spoken of ‘partial homology’ when two parts in different species share developmental 
mechanisms that are homologous (see next section). Neander does not mention these 
phenomena, but in any case they do not show that homology is a similarity relation, any 
more than the existence of hybrid taxa shows that taxon membership is a similarity 
relation. 
 
2.2. Levels of homology 
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One of the most exciting developments of the last decade has been the realization that the 
identity of parts at one level of biological organization may be independent of the identity 
of their constituent parts at a lower level of organization (Wagner 2001; Müller and 
Wagner 1996; Abouheif et al. 1997). This realization came about primarily as a result of 
the discovery of highly conserved gene control circuits underlying traits that are not 
considered to be homologous in themselves. Thus, for example, the paired appendages of 
vertebrates and arthropods share ancient genetic mechanisms that are hypothesized to 
have been in place controlling outgrowths of some sort from the bodies of the most 
ancient animals (Capdevila and Belmonte 2001). More famously, the vertebrate ‘camera’ 
eye and the insect compound eye share genetic mechanisms that may have been involved 
in the induction of a light-sensitive epithelium prior to the evolution of either eye 
(Wagner 2001, 5). Nevertheless, neither arthropod and vertebrate paired appendages nor 
camera and compound eyes are homologous as morphological structures. Conversely, the 
fact that the gene bicoid controls the formation of the anterior-posterior axis in 
Drosophila but not in other dipteran species does not undermine the claim that the 
elements that form along that axis in Drosophila (and indeed the axis itself) are 
homologous to those in other insects (Laublicher and Wagner 2001, 65-66). Closer to 
home, the cascade of gene expression that induces masculinisation of the fetus in Ellobius 
rodents and the male sexual characteristics that result from that process are homologous 
to those seen in other mammalian species, despite the fact that some Ellobius species 
have lost the Y chromosome and SRY, the ‘sex determining’ gene (Just et al. 1995). The 
lesson of these examples is that evolution can preserve a morphological structure whilst 
transforming the molecular mechanism that produces it and, conversely, evolution can 
redeploy an existing mechanism to underpin the development of an evolutionary novelty. 
Arguably, behavior can form another independent level of homology, with the anatomical 
structures that support the behavior being transformed over time while the behavior (e.g. 
the biomechanical profile of a movement) remains the same (Lauder 1990). Levels of 
biological organization are not completely independent, of course. Homology of 
underlying mechanisms is important, but not indefeasible, evidence for homology at a 
higher level. 
 
2.3. ‘Homology concepts’ 
As with the species concept, there are alternative theoretical elucidations of homology, 
which biologists refer to as different ‘homology concepts’ and often think of as 
competitors. Here I can only sketch the two main approaches (for more detail see 
Brigandt 2002, 2003a; Hall 1994, 1999; Wagner 2001). ‘Taxic’ or ‘Darwinian’ 
approaches to homology treat characters in two or more organisms as homologous if they 
are descended from a single character in an ancestral organism. ‘Developmental’ or  
‘biological’ (Wagner 1989) approaches, however, treat characters as homologous if our 
theory of how organisms develop identifies them as instances of the same developmental 
phenomenon at some level of analysis (see above). Günther Wagner has argued that the 
taxic approach is essentially parasitic on a developmental understanding of homology, 
because it defines character identity horizontally - between taxa - but not vertically - 
between parent and offspring. Unlike whole organisms, parts of organisms do not give 
birth to little parts and so two parts in one organism cannot be literally ‘descended from a 
common ancestral part’. The taxic approach thus presupposes and leaves unanalyzed the 
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claim that certain characters in offspring are the same as (homologous to) certain 
characters in their parents. At the level of biological practice, this need not be a serious 
problem. Different homology concepts find their homes in different biological disciplines 
and reflect the particular needs of those disciplines (Brigandt 2002, 2003a). The taxic 
homology concept finds its home in disciplines concerned with reconstructing 
evolutionary change, disciplines that are only concerned with homologies between 
different taxa (‘taxic homologies’). These disciplines can begin with a character set 
consisting of more or less arbitrary, operational characters and bootstrap their way into a 
set of characters whose stability and congruence with one another are reason to believe 
that they represent real morphological units (Griffiths 1999). But at a theoretical level, 
this procedure only works because there are real units of evolutionary change, and the 
taxic homology concept does nothing to explain this: “…the main goal of a biological [= 
developmental] homology concept is to explain why certain parts of the body are passed 
on from generation to generation for millions of years as coherent units of evolutionary 
change…” (Wagner 1994, 279). 
 
The most striking difference between the taxic and developmental approaches is that the 
former is simply inapplicable to ‘serial homology’ – the homology relationship that holds 
between the different vertebrae in the spine or the different segments in an arthropod. 
Two parts in one organism cannot be literally ‘descended from a common ancestral part’, 
as taxic homology requires. One appealing but ultimately uninformative way to deal with 
serial homology is to say that both taxic and serial homology occur when two characters 
‘share genetic information’. This proposed solution can also be extended to answer 
Wagner’s criticism of the taxic homology concept – both homology between taxa and 
homology between offspring and parent occur when two characters ‘share genetic 
information’. But ‘shared genetic information’ here has two possible interpretations. On 
one interpretation the proposed definition does not work and on the other it collapses into 
the developmental homology concept. The first interpretation takes ‘genetic information’ 
to be the sequence information (sensu Crick) located in DNA elements. The discussion of 
levels of homology above shows that homology defined as shared genetic information in 
this sense will yield the wrong answer in many cases (Roth 1999, 321-4; Abouheif et al. 
1997). Shared genetic information in this sense is, like shared embryonic origin, good but 
defeasible evidence for homology. The second interpretation takes ‘genetic information’ 
to be developmental information in some more general sense – whatever it is in the 
developmental matrix that allows organisms to reliably reconstruct form across the 
generations. For example, ‘genetic information’ in this sense may turn out to be an 
emergent and multiply realisable property of genomic regulatory networks. But rather 
than clarifying the homology concept, the appeal to genetic information in this sense is 
no more than a promissory note for a developmental homology concept. The idea that 
homologues reflect shared ‘genetic information’ becomes another way to state that 
characters are homologous if they are instances of the same phenomenon at some level of 
analysis in a theory of how organisms develop.  
 
What, then is homology? It is a manifest fact that the same parts and processes can be 
found in different organisms and in different places in one organism, just as it is a 
manifest fact that organisms form species. Both ideas could be wrong, but the burden of 
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proof is massively on the side of the sceptic. About two hundred years ago biologists 
started to develop powerful operational methods for identifying these parts and processes 
and that research tradition has ever since provided the basis for the investigation of 
structure and (CR) function - ‘the hierarchical basis of comparative biology’ (Hall 1994). 
So homology, like the existence of species, is a phenomenon that stands in need of 
explanation (Brigandt 2003b). It has been clear since Darwin that a critical part of that 
explanation is provided by common descent. However, the criteria of homology have in 
each period reflected the contemporary understanding of how organisms grow, and it is 
clear that developmental biology is another critical component of the explanation. As 
everywhere in science, our understanding of the phenomenon of homology gets refined 
by our attempts to explain it. The few sketches of scientific practice scattered through this 
paper give some idea of our current understanding. 
 
2.4. Homology in molecular biology 
Some molecular biologists use the term ‘homology’ to refer to the degree of 
correspondence between aligned sequences of nucleic acid or protein. Thus, they might 
describe two genes as 50% homologous or as having 50% ‘sequence homology’ (Hillis 
1999). ‘Homology’ in this usage is best regarded, not as an alternative theoretical 
interpretation of homology, but merely as a homonym (Brigandt 2003a). In support of 
this interpretation, note that molecular biologists have invented a new term for homology 
in the traditional sense, or, in fact, two new terms. Nucleic acid sequences, proteins, etc 
which are shared by different species as a result of descent from a single ancestral species 
are called ‘orthologues’ (= taxic homology). Genes in the same genome originating from 
gene duplication events are called ‘paralogues’ (= serial homology). In addition, 
sequences which enter one genome from another genome by lateral transfer are known as 
‘xenologues’. The use of ‘homology’ to refer to mere sequence similarity of molecules 
still raises the hackles of many biologists, including many molecular biologists, so in the 
rest of this paper I will stick to the traditional usage. 
 
3. Neander on Taxic Homology 
Neander (2002) is highly critical of my claim that “A homologous trait is a character that 
unites a clade. Every species in the clade either has the trait or is descended from a 
species that has it” (Griffiths 1994, 212). A clade is a group of species which contains all 
and only the descendants of some ancestral species and this was an attempt to capture the 
notion of taxic homology, which I then called ‘cladistic homology’. My definition is 
inadequate because it takes no account of the alternative approaches to homology 
described above, and because it does not mark the distinction between primitive and 
derived characters, both of which may ‘unite’ a clade in the way I described. But these 
are not Neander’s criticisms. 
 
Neander derives numerous absurdities from my definition, which all depend on the 
assumption that if a homologue is defined as a character shared by a clade, then nothing 
can be said about the homologous character except that it unites that clade. It follows, 
Neander argues, that we cannot distinguish a species that actually has a homologous trait 
from a species which has lost the homologous character through evolution. We cannot 
distinguish two characters shared by the same clade, she argues, and we cannot identify 
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the point in an evolutionary tree at which the character first occurs, because we can say 
nothing about it except that it first occurs at that point. Neander also suggests that 
because all organisms are descended from a single common ancestor, my definition 
collapses all traits to ‘The Trait’, but this criticism seems to rest on her mistaken view 
that homology is a degree property. The rest of Neander’s criticisms come to this: 
“…before two traits can be identified as homologous with respect to each other, we need 
some specification of the traits in question.” (Neander 2002, 402. Her emphasis).  But the 
‘characters’ that feature in my definition are precisely such ‘specifications of the traits in 
question’. My definition was intended to characterise homology as understood in cladistic 
systematics, and it should be read in line with the basic cladistic procedures described in 
my paper. In cladistic systematics homologies are inferred from a set of measured 
similarities between organisms, known as ‘shared characters’. Suppose we want to 
construct a cladogram using data concerning the DNA sequence coding for a suitable 
molecule in each species. Any pair of the aligned sequences will be identical at some 
positions and different at others. Where they are identical, this shared character may be a 
homology or it may be a homoplasy, depending on whether the nearest common ancestor 
of the pair had this character state and whether there have been any intervening character 
state changes in either lineage. Hence when we say that the character state of the first 
nucleotide in each sequence is C we are giving a physical description – that nucleotide is 
cytosine. After constructing the cladogram which our preferred algorithm identifies as the 
best explanation of the whole pattern of similarity and difference amongst the sequences, 
we may conclude that having C at that position is a homologue uniting some clade of the 
organisms we are classifying. But some species in the clade may not have C at that 
position if the simplest explanation of the whole pattern of data is that this particular 
species has lost C. Conversely, some species outside the clade may have acquired C by 
convergent evolution. Those species have the same character state, but in their case it is 
not an example of the homologue we have identified.  
 
It is genuinely confusing that  ‘character’ can mean either any measurable property of an 
organism or only a property regarded as ‘real’ in some theory of the organism. 
Philosophers are familiar just the same ambiguity in the term ‘property’ itself. My (1994) 
only considers cladistic approaches to homology, and it discusses at length the sort of 
phylogenetic inference procedure just described, so I think a charitable reading would 
recognized that ‘character’ in my definition is an operational term, referring to a 
measurable resemblance that may or may not be ‘real’ resemblance (a homology’). I also 
discussed characters like flight and the ‘camera’ eye which make it clear how cladistic 
systematists avoid the absurdities that Neander identifies. The ‘camera’ eye is shared by 
vertebrates and cephalopods but is not homologous in these two taxa. It is perfectly 
consistent to define the vertebrate eye as a certain kind of structure (the camera eye) 
when and only when that structure appears in a particular clade of organisms (the 
vertebrates). Some subterranean vertebrates have lost their eyes and the camera eye 
character evolved independently in some ancestral cephalopod.  
 
I suspect that Neander’s failure to recognise the possibility of using simple, operational 
characters as data to support a more theoretical claim about what the ‘real’ characters are 
reflects her view that no straightforward descriptions of structure or CR function in 
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biology are possible without knowledge of the SE functions of the relevant characters. I 
discuss this claim in Section 6. 
 
 
4. Revanchism I: ‘Functional homologues’ 
Neander offers three arguments for functional revanchism. The third is her ‘master 
argument’, designed to show that all descriptions of structure or CR function in biology 
depend on prior knowledge of the SE function of the relevant characters. She presents 
two other arguments, but in this and the next section I show that they have no force 
independent of the third, master argument.  
 
Neander’s first argument is that biologists need and have categories which she calls 
‘functional homologues’. Now, ‘functional homologues’ in molecular biology are 
sequences that they play the same causal role (Abouheif et al. 1997), and ‘homologies of 
function’ in morphology are functions which two species can perform because their 
common ancestor performed them, but Neander’s ‘functional homologues’ are taxic 
homologues which stand out in a transformation sequence because they introduce a novel 
functional role – something closer to what biologists mean by a ‘key innovation’. She 
writes: 
 
“If we conceive of the phylogenetic tree as a branching flow of (genetic and 
other) information, the issue is how to draw a conceptual line in this flow. Clearly 
there will be few if any sharp boundaries. Nonetheless, we must distinguish one 
trait from another, for physiology requires such distinctions. My suggestion, the 
central suggestion of this chapter, is this: One main way in which this is done is 
by drawing conceptual lines at those places where there is a significant change in 
what there was selection for. (Neander 2002, 403)  
 
The picture Neander seems to have in mind is that of a paleontologist following the 
transformation of, say, a lobe-fin into a tetrapod limb  and being unable to say in exactly 
which ancestor the transition from fin to limb occurred. This picture is consistent with her 
belief that homology is a degree property which does not allow any sharp boundaries to 
be drawn. Now, of course, homology is not a degree property, and even if it were, 
changes in selection pressure would not be a good place to look for sharp boundaries. But 
it may be a mistake to take Neander at her word when she says that homologues grade 
indistinguishably into one another. We can read her as a traditional Darwinian gradualist 
who believes that there is a vast hierarchy of homologies within homologies, each 
representing a tiny character state change, and that the problem is to single out some of 
these changes as significant. On this reading she is confronting the genuine biological 
problem of the nature of evolutionary novelty.  
 
The most detailed example Neander gives of how adaptive function can supplement a 
classification by homology concerns “the mammalian inner ear bones and the reptilian 
jaw bones  and the portions of the gill arches of fishes that are their homologues” 
(Neander 2002, 402). What she has in mind is that one of the mammalian ear ossicles, the 
incus, is homologous with the quadrate bone (fused to the skull) in reptiles and other 
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tetrapods. This in turn is homologous to a region of the palatoquadrate bone in other 
teleosts, the clade that unites bony fishes and all terrestrial vertebrates. This character in 
teleosts is homologous with the dorsal portion of the mandibular arch (jaw) in sharks and 
rays, and this character in gnathostomes, the clade of jawed vertebrates, is homologous 
with the first gill-arch in jawless fish, such as the lamprey (Fig. 1.). It is plausible that 
these distinct characters were linked by many intermediates and Neander claims that 
biologists divide the series into a small number of named characters because they ‘[draw] 
conceptual lines at those places where there is a significant change in what there was 
selection for (For example, from selection for jaw support to selection for audition)’ 
(403). Her suggestion is that the transformation series from gill arch to incus should be 
divided into three segments rather than two or four because there are two distinct changes 
of SE function, from breathing to ‘jaw support’ and later to ‘audition’. But, first, this is 
certainly not the only way in which biologists single out some character state changes as 
particularly significant, and, second, when biologists do treat a character state change as a 
‘key innovation’ this is not because they need to draw a line in a bafflingly complex 
transformation series. These points are evident in Neander’s own example. In standard 
presentations, the series is divided into five characters, not three, two of which, the 
palatoquadrate bone and the quadrate bone, function to support the jaw (the 
palatoquadrate cartilage is the upper jaw). The prominence of these five stages stems 
from the fact that they are the actual character states seen in major taxa – mammals, 
reptiles, bony fishes, cartilaginous fishes and jawless fishes. Whilst there were 
undoubtedly intermediate stages in evolution, these do not prevent anatomists from 
defining homologies for the same reason that the gradual evolution of species does not 
bring taxonomy to a halt. The fact that these five characters are not defined by their SE 
function in the way Neander suggests is evident from prominent theories about their 
evolution. The quadrate bone in reptiles, where it is fused to the skull, does play a role in 
hearing. It transmits vibration from the ground – something with obvious adaptive 
significance for both predator and prey. The transformation of the quadrate into the incus 
may have been driven by increased selection for hearing in early, nocturnal mammals. 
What creates an obvious break at this point in the series is not change of function, but the 
traditional morphological criteria – whether the bone is fused to the skull. Turning to the 
other character that Neander claims is defined by an SE function, an important recent 
study suggests that the initial evolution of the vertebrate jaw – the enlargement and more 
powerful articulation of the first gill arch to allow it to close the mouth cavity – was an 
adaptation to move water through the gills and was later co-opted for feeding (Mallatt 
1996). Thus, while ‘jaw’ is plausibly a functional term, like ‘wing’, the vertebrate jaw 
itself is not defined by its function, but is a homologue individuated by morphological 
criteria.  
 
Neander’s ‘functional homologues’ resemble biologists’ ‘key innovations’ – features like 
the vertebrate jaw which allow an organism to perform a new adaptive function and may 
underpin an adaptive radiation by its descendants (Mayr 1960). In modern synthesis 
biology, with its strong emphasis on gradual change, this idea was used to make sense of 
the idea of evolutionary novelty: novelties are character state changes which enable new 
functions. However, this notion was not introduced to draw distinctions in bafflingly 
continuous transformation series, but to elucidate the idea that some new characters are 
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genuinely novel, whilst other are merely variations on a theme. Moreover, recent work on 
evolutionary novelty has focused on a different elucidation of this idea: a novelty is a 
character that cannot be homologised to any preexisting character, such as the Chelonian 
(turtle) shell (Müller and Wagner 1991; for philosophical discussion, see Love 2001; 
Love 2004). So while some homologues may be prominent because their appearance 
marks the ability to perform a new function (first as CR, then as SE), others are 
prominent because their appearance marks the beginning of a new structure. 
 
 
5. Revanchism II: The appeal to practice 
Before turning to Neander’s ‘master argument’ I need to consider her straightforward 
appeal to practice. Neander points out that biologists study the function, as well as the 
structure, of the parts of organisms and offers an example in which physiologists have 
classified muscle fibres using a functional property, namely the manner in which they 
contract (2002, 408). She says that systematists sometimes look at these functional 
properties when making homology judgments (409). The problem with this appeal to 
practice is that it equivocates on two sense of the word ‘function’. Descriptive functional 
properties (e.g. actual causal roles) play a critical role in anatomical and physiological 
reasoning. But descriptive functional properties, such as the biomechanical properties of 
the jaw or units of animal behavior, such as those that compose the famous courtship 
display of the Great Crested Grebe, are on a par with descriptive structural properties like 
bone density or feather morphology. These descriptive properties, whether functional or 
structural, are the things that are judged homologous or analogous between species. The 
relative importance of descriptions of CR function and descriptions of structure in 
anatomy and physiology is a completely separate issue from the relative importance of 
SE function and homology.  
 
There is a sense in which this reply is unfair to Neander, since she believes that all 
references to function (and indeed structure) are implicitly references to adaptive 
function. But unless that ‘master argument’ succeeds, her appeal to biological practice 
simply fails to mark the distinction between what something actually does and what 
natural selection has designed it to do. Moreover, not marking this distinction causes her 
to entirely misunderstand Amundson and Lauder’s (1994) position. Neander argues that 
their account reduces to the view that biological classification is classification by 
structure alone (2002, 409-10). Even the title of their paper is misleading, because it 
promises a defense of ‘the use of causal role functions in biology’ whilst the paper only 
advocates the use of structural descriptions in biology (Neander 2002, 393). But Lauder 
is a functional morphologist, and well-known for his advocacy of the importance of 
functional characters in diagnosing homology! If we consider Neander’s own example, 
muscle contractions, Lauder has written, “I would argue that any definable pattern of 
muscle movement is an organismal character just like any structural feature. Just like a 
structural character, functions may be considered homologous if they characterize a 
natural, monophyletic clade of taxa.” (Lauder 1999, 186) The idea that Amundson and 
Lauder advocate classification by structure alone is quite mistaken. They think 
anatomical characters are classified by homology in the sense usual in the science of 
which Lauder is a practitioner and Amundson a historian – a historical relationship 
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diagnosed using evidence from both structural and (CR) functional characters, from 
relative position, embryonic origin, developmental mechanisms, genetic involvement, 
and so forth. Neander accuses them of mistaking the structural criteria used to recognize 
characters for what actually defines those characters (2002, 410). In fact, they use those 
structural criteria in just the way she recommends, but to infer homology, not SE 
function. They make a powerful case that ‘functional’ anatomy and morphology study 
CR functions and Neander’s appeal to practice does nothing to blunt the force of their 
argument. It is left to her deeper, philosophical argument to convince us that when 
scientists report the results of their experimental analyses of anatomical structures they 
are, implicitly, inferring the selection history of those structures. 
 
6. Revanchism III: Abnormality inclusive categories 
Neander’s argument that all references to function (and indeed structure) in anatomy, 
physiology, morphology and similar sciences are implicitly references to selection history 
is simple. She notes that the categories used in these sciences include abnormal instances. 
A diseased heart is still a heart, and, to get away from that hackneyed example, an 
abnormal courtship display produced by a neurologically impaired Grebe is still a 
courtship display. She argues that ‘abnormality inclusive categories’ must be ‘essentially 
historical categories’(2002, 413), from which she infers that they must be defined by SE 
function: 
 
“The relevant notions [of function and structure] are both ‘normative’ in the sense 
that they are both notions of the normal, in the teleological as opposed to the 
statistical sense of the term, if we assume an etiological account of each of them, 
Abnormality inclusive categories involve a notion of structure and function that is, to 
recall the title of Amundson and Lauder’s paper, with, not without, a purpose.” 
(Neander 2002, 414) 
 
The problem with this argument is that categories of taxic homology are also ‘essentially 
historical’. Abnormal and diseased instances of a character are homologous to normal 
instances because abnormal and diseased instances are descended from the same common 
ancestor as normal instances. Although it is not essentially historical, the developmental 
approach to homology also yields abnormality inclusive categories: it would be puzzling 
if an approach designed to identify characters across evolutionary transformations could 
not identify them across perturbing causes such as disease processes! Thus, for example, 
my first cervical vertebrae is serially homologous to my damaged third lumbar vertebrae 
for the same reason that it is serially homologous to my undamaged fourth lumbar 
vertebrae. All three vertebrae differ in form, but all are instances of a repeated unit of 
development identified by a theory of the vertebrate skeleton. The development of L3 
was a perturbation of that particular developmental pattern.  
 
Neander’s haste in inferring that only categories defined by SE function can be 
abnormality inclusive may stem from her mistakenly attributing to Amundson and 
Lauder the view that anatomical categories are defined by purely structural criteria. Such 
a theory would be unable to handle abnormality inclusive categories. In any case, the 
claim that all structural and functional categories in biology are categories of ‘normal’ 
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structure and function, that is to say, categories defined by a shared selective history, 
cannot possibly be correct. Classifications by SE function are logically dependent on 
prior classifications by homology (Griffiths 1994, 213-214; see also Neander 2002, 405 
fn.12) and homology is determined using structural and functional characters, so if 
Neander were correct biology would go around in circles. The argument is simple: 
 
1. A character has a selected effect function only if it is a member of a lineage of 
characters that has a history of selection for that function  
2. Organisms give birth to organisms, but characters do not give birth to little 
characters and so they do not form lineages except as corresponding parts of 
ancestor and descendant, that is, as homologues 
3. Therefore, selected effect functions can only be assigned to items that have an 
identity as homologues 
4. Homology is inferred from descriptive character data, both structural and (CR) 
functional 
5. Therefore, if Neander were correct that all references to structural or functional 
characters make an implicit claim about their selection histories, then biologists 
would have to assign selection histories to characters before knowing that they are 
members of a lineage of copies, which is absurd 
 
It might be suggested in Neander’s defense that biologists assign characters a 
hypothetical selection history based on their current (CR) function and use this 
classification by hypothetical SE function to get started, but this admits that biologists 
can classify characters by CR function first and use that knowledge of CR function to 
work out SE function, which is to abandon Neander’s position.  
 
Neander’s ‘master argument’ fails, and in any case the need for abnormality inclusive 
categories can be met using homology. But this is not to say that biology does not use SE 
functional categories! Classifications by shared evolutionary purpose (SE function) are 
known as ‘analogies’. They group together homologues in virtue of shared features of 
their (separate) selection histories. Birds and bats have wings for flying and both 
vertebrates and invertebrates have legs for walking, so ‘wing’ and ‘leg’ are analogies, but 
the avian wing, the chiropteran wing, the tetrapod limb, and arthropod paired appendages 
are all homologies. Categories of analogy are essential when studying adaptation. To test 
a model of optimal wing design for maneuvering flight in a forest canopy, we need a 
representative sample of wings which have evolved to enable their bearers, whether birds 
or bats, to fly through dense forest (SE function). Part of being a ‘representative sample’ 
is taking into account phylogeny, as characters that are homologous to one another are 
not genuinely independent data points for this test. The use of these two classification 
schemes to illuminate one another is the ‘comparative method’ in biology (Griffiths 
1996a) – we need both the ‘unity of type’ and the ‘effect of the conditions of existence’ 
to understand biological form (Darwin 1964, 206). 
 
7. Millikan’s functional revanchism 
Millikan is sceptical whether CR functions (‘Cummins functions’) can be assigned to 
parts of an organism without considering the organism’s selective history. A purely 
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descriptive, rather than normative, biology has no principled way to determine what 
counts as the system in need of analysis: 
 
“A chunk of matter, depending on what are considered its allowable inputs, may 
exemplify many different Cummins systems at once…What counts as a Cummins 
function is relative to choice of an ideal type to be explained. …  
 
Living chunks of matter do not come, just as such, with instructions about what 
are allowable conditions of operation and what is to count as allowable input. 
Similarly, they do not come with instructions telling [what is] damage, 
breakdowns or weardowns. Nor do they come with instructions about which 
processes…are to count as occurring within and which are irrelevant or accidental 
to the system.” (Millikan 2002, 121) 
 
Millikan demands a ‘principled and useful way to delimit Cummins systems’ (Millikan 
2002, 121), identifying boundary conditions for their operation, distinguishing variation 
from pathology, and delimiting the boundaries of a single system, so that we can subject 
the correct aspects of nature to causal analysis. Interestingly, this issue was highlighted 
by the founders of ethology, who criticised behaviourist psychology for analysing 
capacities of animals that are biologically meaningless – as if, in Millikan’s metaphor, 
one were to study how washing machines work by examining how they burn.  
 
These are genuine problems, and they require looking at the organism from an 
evolutionary perspective, but not in the sense Millikan suggests. It cannot be the case that 
biologists need to know the selective history of an organism before they describe the 
contributions of its parts to its biological functioning. If this were true, biology would be 
trapped in a vicious regress. Once again, the argument is simple: 
 
1. Ascriptions of selected effect function are generated by (hypothetical) causal 
analysis of the capacities of ancestral organisms to survive and reproduce in 
ancestral environments (Griffiths 1993) 
2. If we cannot identify which capacities of ancestral organisms to subject to causal 
analysis without knowing what the parts of those organism were selected for in 
their ancestors, then we face a vicious regress 
3. Therefore, a purely causal analysis of the adaptive role played by parts of 
ancestral organisms must be possible without knowing what those parts were 
adaptations for 
4. Furthermore, ancestral organisms cannot be easier to causally analyze than living 
organisms on which we can actually experiment (Stotz and Griffiths 2002) 
 
To avoid this paradox we must distinguish two kinds of functioning which are privileged 
from an evolutionary viewpoint. The first is SE functioning (adaptations). The second is 
CR functioning which contributes to survival and reproduction (adaptive traits). The 
importance of the second notion for causal analysis is made clear in Niko Tinbergen’s 
famous ‘On the Aims and Methods of Ethology’ (1963). To understand an organism from 
a biological point of view we need to answer four questions: 
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1. Causation 




Questions of causation ask about the mechanisms by which organisms do what they do, 
and questions of ontogeny ask how those mechanisms are built (‘causal biology’). 
 
Questions of survival value ask: “whether any effect of the observed process contributes 
to survival if so how survival is promoted and whether it is promoted better by the 
observed process than by slightly different processes.” It is “a confusion of the study of 
natural selection with that of survival value” (Tinbergen 1963, 418) which leads to the 
mistaken view that survival value cannot be studied by ‘exact experimentation’. Even 
creationists would need to answer questions of survival value: “To those who argue that 
the only function of studies of survival value is to strengthen the theory of natural 
selection I should like to say: even if the present-day animals were created the way they 
are now, the fact that they manage to survive would pose the problem of how they do 
this.” (423, my emphasis) 
 
Questions of evolution have “two major aims: the elucidation of the course evolution 
must be assumed to have taken, and the unraveling of its dynamics.” (1963, 428)  The 
course of evolution is revealed by inferring phylogenies and homologies. The dynamics 
of evolution are revealed by the study of 1) population genetics and 2) survival value 
(428), which correspond to Sober’s (1984) evolutionary ‘consequence laws’ and ‘source 
laws’. 
 
With Tinbergen’s analysis in hand we see that Millikan is right - a biologically 
meaningful causal analysis must be carried out from an evolutionary perspective. But 
rather than focus on those causal capacities that featured in past episodes of selection, we 
should focus on causal capacities that contribute to survival and reproduction. How we 
define the ‘system’ will reflect our theories about evolution. If there is more than one 
level of selection, there will be more than one ‘system’ to analyse. More than one account 
of the ‘system’ may be needed to describe evolutionary processes at one level of 
selection, if not all the measures of ‘fitness’ needed to model evolutionary dynamics can 
be grounded in a single physical propensity (Rosenberg and Bouchard 2002). Turning to 
boundary conditions for an organism’s functioning, a principled choice, at least for 
evolutionary analysis, would be the parameter ranges of the ‘fundamental niche’ – the 
ecological hyperspace within which a population could maintain itself indefinitely 
(Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 270). Finally, the distinction between pathology and 
polymorphism is sometimes obvious (most pathology is not heritable) and sometimes 
problematic. It has been argued that alleles for haemochromatosis (excessive iron 
accumulation in tissues) are advantageous to women living under scarcity, whilst under 
abundance they are neutral in women and harmful in men. It is unclear why a geneticist 
or physiologist needs to definitively answer whether carriers of these alleles are sick or 
merely different.  
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This last point reveals another problem with the recent enthusiasm for SE function. 
Biological systems are highly variable, and enthusiasts for SE function argue that 
biologists deal with this by constructing an ideal type which is ‘Normal’, meaning as 
evolution designed it to be. Now, biologists do work with idealised model systems, but 
‘Normal’ systems are only one sort. First, like all scientists, biologists construct 
mathematical models of complex systems, abstracting away not from the ‘abNormal’ but 
from any aspect of the biology that cannot be tractably modelled with the chosen 
formalism. Second, the purpose of many ‘model systems’ is to facilitate discovering basic 
mechanisms. For this purpose, it is more important that they are tractable in the 
laboratory than that they are representative of natural systems. Laboratory strains of C. 
elegans were not bred to be ‘Normal’ but to be identical and easy to maintain. Third, for 
many purposes a model system is a reference standard against which variation can be 
studied. It is more important that it is standard than that it is Normal or that it is 
representative. ‘The human genome’ is a good example.  Of course, for some purposes, 
particularly in evolutionary biology, the distinction between ‘Normal’ variation 
(biological polymorphism) and pathological variation is significant. But this is not the 
primary way in which experimental biologists abstract away from variation to obtain 




The etiological theory of function captures the sense of ‘function’ in which many neo-
Darwinians have used the term: the purpose(s) for which a character evolved by natural 
selection (SE function). The sense of ‘function’ in which biologists have talked for over a 
century about ‘form and function’, and the sense in which sciences such as anatomy, 
physiology, comparative morphology, developmental and molecular biology 
experimentally elucidate ‘form and function’ is causal role (CR) function. Biological 
characters are primarily individuated by homology. Biologists use structural and (CR) 
functional descriptive characters, including relative position, embryonic origin, 
developmental mechanisms, gene expression, and so forth, to classify parts and processes 
by homology. Those parts and processes are assigned selective histories and SE functions 
in the light of their identity as homologues. The claim that no biological description is 
possible without making implicit claims about the selective history of the characters 
described is mistaken, and, if correct, would be an epistemological disaster. Of course, 
the body of established biological knowledge, which includes knowledge about selection 
histories, functions as background information in future investigations of any biological 
topic, including classification, but selection history cannot play the direct and 
foundational role in classification assigned to it by enthusiasts for SE function. Finally, 
whilst ‘Normality’ is one form of biological idealisation, it is not the only one and does 
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Figure 1. Homologies of the mammalian incus. 
